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Abstract
Modus Ponens says that if you know A and you know that A im-
plies B then you know B. This is a basic rule that we take for granted
and use repeatedly, but there is a gem of a theorem in logic by Gentzen
to the eect that it is not needed in some logical systems. It is fun to
say \You can make proofs without lemmas" to mathematicians and
watch how they react, but our true intention here is to let go of logic
as a reection of reasoning and move towards combinatorial aspects.
Proofs contain basic problems of algorithmic complexity within their
framework, and there is strong geometric and dynamical avor inside
them.
1 The beginning of the story
Mathematicians are making proofs every day. In proof theory one studies
proofs. This is frightening to many mathematicians, but a principal theme
of the present exposition is to treat logic unemotionally.
The idea of complexity sheds an interesting light on proofs. A basic
question is whether a propositional tautology of size n should always have a
short proof, a proof of size p(n) for some polynomial p for instance. There
is a proof system in which this is true if and only if \NP = co NP". The
latter is an unsolved general question in computational complexity which is
related to the existence of polynomial-time algorithms in cases where only
exponential algorithms are known. We shall say more about this later. The
equivalence was established in [16].
Sometimes proofs have to be long if one does not permit a rule like Modus
Ponens. Such a rule allows dynamics within the implicit computations oc-
curring in proofs. In tracing through a proof one may visit the same formula
repeatedly with many substitutions. The level in the hierarchy of proof
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systems at which dynamics appears is the rst at which little is known con-
cerning the existence of short proofs of hard tautologies. At lower levels it is
known that there are tautologies with only exponential size proofs. Dynami-
cal structure in proofs seems to be important for making proofs short. (This
is discussed further in [14].)
The idea of dynamical structure in proofs may seem odd at rst, but it
is very natural, both in ordinary mathematical activity and in formal logic.
There is a way to eliminate the nontrivial dynamical structure from a proof,
but at great cost in expansion. This is the matter of cut elimination that we
shall discuss here.
Before we get to that we should review some background information
about logic and complexity. Our discussion will be informal, but one can
nd more precision and detail in [30, 36, 48]. We begin with some comments
about propositional logic, predicate logic, and arithmetic.
Propositional logic is the simplest of the three. One has variables, often
called p, q, etc., and one can build formulas out of them using standard con-
nectives, _ (or), ^ (and), : (negation). In predicate logic one uses the same
connectives, and one also has the quantiers 8 (for all) and 9 (there exists) for
making formulas like 9xF (x). Here x is a variable and F is a relation, in this
case a unary relation. Relations may depend on more variables. Constants
and functions may also be used inside arguments of relations, and the func-
tions are permitted to depend on an arbitrary number of variables. Thus one
can make substitutions to create formulas like 8x9yG((x; y);  ((x); c)),
where G is a binary relation, ,  are functions of two variables, x, y are
variables, and c is a constant symbol. Expressions like (x; y),  ((x); c) are
called terms, and in general terms may be constructed from constants and
variables using any combination of functions. For arithmetic one permits ad-
ditional symbols to represent numbers and basic arithmetic operations, and
one adds axioms about the arithmetic objects. For example, in arithmetic
x+ y is a term, x + y = z is a formula, and there is an axiom to the eect
that x+ 0 = x.
The provable statements in arithmetic are called theorems. The same
term is used in any context in which there are special axioms describing a
mathematical structure, like arithmetic. Statements which are true indepen-
dently of particular mathematical structure, as in ordinary propositional or
predicate logic, are called tautologies.
Propositional and predicate logic are sound and complete. Roughly speak-
ing this means that provability is equivalent to being true in all interpreta-
tions. In contexts with extra mathematical structure (like arithmetic) one
should restrict oneself to interpretations which are compatible with the given
structure.
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These three systems are very dierent in terms of the levels of complexity
that arise naturally in them. For this discussion we need to have some notions
from complexity theory, but rather than descend into details let us just say
a few words. The reader probably has already a reasonable idea of what is
an algorithm. To make it more formal one has to be precise about what
are the acceptable inputs and outputs. A typical output might simply be
an answer of \YES" or \NO". The input should be encoded as a string of
symbols, a \word" in the language generated by some alphabet. For instance,
formulas in logic can be encoded in this way. A basic method to measure the
complexity of an algorithm is to ask how long it takes the algorithm to give
an answer when the input has length n (= the number of symbols). Is the
amount of time bounded by a polynomial in n, an exponential in n, some
tower of exponentials, etc.
In propositional logic the problems that typically arise are resolvable by
obvious algorithms in exponential time, and the dicult questions concern
the existence of polynomial time procedures. For instance, given a proposi-
tional formula A, let us ask whether it is not a tautology. This question can
be resolved in exponential time, by checking truth tables. This is actually an
\NP" problem, which amounts to the fact that if A is not a tautology, then
there is a fast reason for it, namely a set of truth values for the propositional
variables inside A for which the result is \False". The diculty is that this
choice of truth values depends on A and a priori one has to search through
a tree to nd it. This problem turns out to be NP-complete, which means
that if one can nd a polynomial-time algorithm for resolving it, then one
can do the same for all other NP problems, such as the travelling salesman
problem, or determining whether a graph has a Hamiltonian cycle.
By contrast in predicate logic one typically faces issues of algorithmic
decidability or undecidability. That is, whether there is an algorithm at
all that always gives the right answer, never mind how long it takes. The
problem of determining whether a formula in predicate logic is a tautology is
algorithmically undecidable. One can think of this as a matter of complexity,
as follows. The tautologies in predicate logic of length at most n is a nite
set for which one can choose a nite set of proofs. Let f(n) denote the
maximum of the lengths of the shortest proofs of tautologies of length  n.
The fact that there is no algorithm for determining whether or not a formula
is a tautology means that f(n) grows very fast, faster than any recursive
function.
In order to nd a proof of a tautology one has to permit a huge expansion.
This is reminiscent of the word problem for nitely presented groups. Again
there is no algorithm to determine whether a given word is trivial or not.
One can think of this in terms of the huge (nonrecursive) expansion of a
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word which may be needed to establish its triviality.
This is a nice feature of proof theory and complexity. If one looks at
the standard examples of complexity problems that deal with exponential
versus polynomial time, they are usually very dierent from the standard
examples of problems that are algorithmically decidable or undecidable. In
proofs they can t under the same roof in a nice way. \Herbrand's theorem"
{ discussed in Section 7 below { permits one to code predicate logic in terms
of propositional logic, but with large expansion.
What about arithmetic? In arithmetic innite processes can occur, com-
ing from mathematical induction. One can still study the level of \innite
complexity" though. (This terminology may seem strange, but indeed the
idea of measuring innite complexity is present in many areas of mathemat-
ics, even if it is not always expressed as such. A lot of classical analysis can
be seen in this way. One cannot describe a general function with a nite
number of parameters, but one can do this approximately in the presence
of some smoothness conditions, with the degree of approximation related to
the degree of smoothness. With little or no smoothness even the approxi-
mate behavior must be counted in more innite ways. The dierentiability
almost everywhere of Lipschitz functions provides a good example of this
phenomenon. One encounters the necessity of innite processes in topology
as well.)
There are dynamics inside proofs, and these dynamics seem to be closely
related to the matters of complexity just described, in all three cases, of
propositional logic and predicate logic and arithmetic. Our next task is to
describe a precise logical system in which we can work, and then explain the
cut-elimination theorem, which provides an eective procedure for eliminat-
ing dynamics from proofs. We shall discuss some of the combinatorial aspects
of cut-elimination, and some of its consequences. We shall give examples of
proofs which use cuts in an interesting way, starting with the John-Nirenberg
theorem in real analysis. The proof constructs an expanding tree of intervals
in the real line by iterating a process that is coded in a single lemma. The
proof has an interesting dynamical structure, in which an interval that is
produced by the lemma is then fed back into the lemma to make more inter-
vals, and so forth. This is an example of the kind of substitution that one
expects in complicated proofs in predicate logic. We give a more elementary
example with similar dynamical structure in Section 9. This example comes
from [12] and is easier to formalize precisely. In Section 10 we explain the
notion of the logical ow graph which provides a tool for seeing dynamical
structure within proofs more clearly.
We would like to thank M. Baaz, M. Gromov, R. Kaye and C. Tomei for
their comments and suggestions.
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2 Sequent calculus
In our discussion of logic so far we have talked about the language { what is a
formula? { but not about proofs. The choice of proof system is a nontrivial
matter. We shall work with sequent calculus and the logical system LK.
This turns out to have nice combinatorial properties, as we shall see.
The concept of a sequent can be a little confusing at rst. A sequent is
something of the form
A
1
; A
2
; : : : ; A
m
! B
1
; B
2
; : : : ; B
n
where the A
i
's and the B
j
's are formulas. The interpretation of this sequent
is \from A
1
and A
2
and ... and A
m
follows B
1
or B
2
or ... or B
n
". However,
the arrow ! is not a connective, nor is the sequent a formula.
Because we are using ! for sequents in this manner, we use the symbol
 for the connective that represents implication. If A and B are formulas,
then A  B is also a formula, which is interpreted as \A implies B".
So then what is the point of sequents? Why do we not simply use the
formula
A
1
^ A
2
^ : : : ^ A
m
 B
1
_B
2
_ : : : _B
n
?
The two have the same interpretation, but they are dierent combinatorially.
Even in ordinary reasoning we would not normally take all of our information
A
1
, ..., A
m
and package it into the single unit A
1
^ : : : ^ A
m
. The commas
permit us to treat the formulas A
i
, B
j
as individuals which can each be used
separately. We shall see that this exibility is important in the system LK,
for which we have certain monotonicity properties in the way that formulas
are constructed.
We should say that in a sequent as above, the formulas A
i
and B
j
are
permitted to have repetitions, and this turns out to be important. We do
not care about the ordering, however. We might say \multisets" of formulas
to make clear that we mean unordered collections in which repetitions are
counted. We also permit empty sets of formulas, e.g.,
A
1
; A
2
; : : : ; A
m
! and ! B
1
; B
2
; : : : ; B
n
are permissible sequents. As a matter of notation we shall typically use
upper-case roman letters A;B;C::: to denote formulas, and upper-case greek
letters like  ;;::: to denote collections of formulas.
For a nice example of a sequent, consider  ! , where   is the collection
of formulas
  = f
n
_
j=1
p
i;j
: i = 1; : : : ; n+ 1g
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and  is the collection of formulas
 = fp
i;j
^ p
m;j
: 1  i < m  n+ 1; 1  j  ng:
The p
i;j
's here are propositional variables. The sequent  !  represents a
nite version of the pigeon-hole principle: if you have n+1 balls, and each ball
is placed in one of n boxes, then there is at least one box which contains two
balls. It is a valid sequent whose proof is somewhat tricky in propositional
logic. Normally we think of it as a part of more powerful languages for which
the proof is immediate, but in propositional logic it is more subtle, as we
shall see.
Here now is the system LK. It should be interpreted as follows. Our
basic objects are sequents, in the sense that we prove a sequent, we do not
prove a formula. If we want to think of proving a formula A, then we should
prove the sequent! A. To prove a sequent we begin with axioms and derive
new sequents from them using certain rules. For LK the axioms are sequents
of the form
A; ! ; A
where A is any formula and  ; are any collections of formulas. The rules
come in two groups, logical rules and structural rules. In these rules we write
 ,  
1
,  
2
, etc., for collections of formulas, and we write  
1;2
as a shorthand for
the combination of  
1
and  
2
. Remember always that we allow repetitions,
so that one must count multiplicities when combining collections of formulas,
and that we do not care about the ordering of the formulas on either side of
the sequent.
The logical rules are used to introduce connectives, and they are given as
follows:
: : left
 ! ; A
:A; !  : : right
A; ! 
 ! ;:A
^ : right
 
1
! 
1
; A  
2
! 
2
; B
 
1;2
! 
1;2
; A ^B
^ : left
A;B; ! 
A ^B; ! 
_ : left
A; 
1
! 
1
B; 
2
! 
2
A _B; 
1;2
! 
1;2
_ : right
 ! ; A;B
 ! ; A _B
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: left
 
1
! 
1
; A B; 
2
! 
2
A  B; 
1;2
! 
1;2
: right
A; ! ; B
 ! ; A  B
9 : left
A(b); ! 
(9x)A(x); !  9 : right
 ! ; A(t)
 ! ; (9x)A(x)
8 : left
A(t); ! 
(8x)A(x); !  8 : right
 ! ; A(b)
 ! ; (8x)A(x)
The structural rules do not involve connectives and are the following:
Cut
 
1
! 
1
; A A; 
2
! 
2
 
1;2
! 
1;2
Contraction
 ! ; A;A
 ! ; A
A;A; ! 
A; ! 
This is the system LK for ordinary predicate logic. For propositional
logic one drops the rules with quantiers, and formulas are merely boolean
combinations of propositional variables (with no functions or substitutions).
One should be a little careful about the rules for the quantiers. In
9 : right and 8 : left, any term t is allowed which does not include a variable
which lies already within the scope of a quantier in the given formula A. In
9 : left and 8 : right one has the \eigenvariable" b which should not occur
free in  , .
This presentation of logic is quite dierent from what one ordinarily sees
in an undergraduate course. It is easy to check however that the axioms and
rules make sense in terms of usual reasoning.
The rule that probably looks the strangest is the cut rule. One can think
of it as an elaboration on Modus Ponens, and again one can check that it is
compatible with standard reasoning.
Although LK does represent classical logic, it does so with some un-
usual subtleties, some properties of monotonicity and conservation. Formu-
las never get simpler. The logical rules permit us to make new formulas by
combining old ones, and to introduce connectives, but they do not permit
us to simplify formulas. Formulas never disappear, except in cuts. The only
other simplication allowed is contraction, in which a repetition is reduced.
Formulas do not appear suddenly. Everything has to be constructed from
the formulas in the axioms.
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An important consequence of this is that the size of a proof is controlled
by the axioms, unless one stupidly applies the negation rules over and over
again for no reason. In a large proof one should typically expect a large
number of axioms. If the proof is large but the number of axioms is much
smaller, and one does not repeat the negation rules in a foolish manner,
then it means that there are a lot of \weak formulas", i.e., the formulas
coming from the  's and 's in the axioms A;  ! ; A. If this happens
then either the proof relied on foolish contortions involving weak formulas,
so that it could be shortened, or the proof has a small number of steps and
the endsequent is full of formulas coming from weak formulas, which is not
too interesting.
Sometimes a crucial ingredient for the size of a proof looks dumb in terms
of reasoning. The contraction rule, for instance, looks pretty silly, but we
shall see in the next sections that it matters much for complexity. (In Linear
logic [24], an extension of classical logic, contractions are controlled in an
explicit way through exponential operators.) The problem of whether or not
a sequent has a short proof can be seen as a purely combinatorial issue, apart
from reasoning.
3 Cut elimination
Theorem 1 (Gentzen [22, 25, 57]) Any proof in LK can be eectively trans-
formed into a proof which never uses the cut rule. This works for both propo-
sitional and predicate logic.
There is a version of this for arithmetic but one has to allow innite
proofs, because of induction. One can analyze the level of inniteness used,
measured by countable ordinals, as in [51].
This is a gorgeous theorem. It says rst that we can make proofs with-
out Modus Ponens, which is a bit striking. It also has nice consequences,
including the subformula property: given a proof of a sequent which does not
use the cut rule, then every formula which appears in the proof also appears
as a subformula of a formula in the nal sequent. This follows from the
monotonicity properties of LK.
There is a nice image associated to proofs in LK and the way that for-
mulas are constructed. One can code the combinatorics of the construction
of a formula with a tree. Combining two formulas A and B into A ^ B, for
instance, corresponds to combining the trees associated to A and B. As for-
mulas progress through LK they are constructed in this manner. The trees
never disappear when there are no cuts.
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We shall discuss the proof of the cut-elimination theorem in a moment,
but let us begin with the following question: what is the price for eliminating
cuts? Just think about the diculty in ordinary mathematical activity of
making proofs which satisfy the subformula property.
The price comes in the expansion. The elimination of cuts leads to a
simplication in the dynamical structure of the proof at the cost of large
expansion in the size. There are propositional tautologies for which cut-free
proofs must be exponentially larger than proofs with cuts, and in predicate
logic the expansion can be non-elementary. See [44, 45, 53, 54, 55, 58].
A nicely concrete example of this expansion is provided by the pigeon-hole
principle. We saw in the preceding section how the pigeon-hole principle can
be formalized as a sequence of propositional sequents, one for each positive
integer n. It turns out that the pigeon-hole principle can be proved in LK
with a proof of polynomial size in n if one allows cuts [7], while exponential
size is required for proofs without cuts [31]. See [1, 2, 49, 4, 3] for related
work. Analogous results hold for the propositional version of the Ramsey
theorem (see [47]).
The idea of lengths of proofs is quite amusing from the perspective of
reasoning. It suggests that there are some statements that are true that we
cannot understand in practice because it would take too long, and that there
are statements which we can understand if we permit ourselves to use cuts
and not otherwise. Induction plays a similar role in arithmetic, and indeed
the strength of induction required in arithmetic for various purposes has been
much studied. (See [30].)
What is it about the cut rule that permits this compression of proofs? One
can think that the size of the proof is being compressed even if the dynamical
content remains the same in essence. The use of lemmas permits one to
make repeated substitutions with the same coding. We shall see this more
concretely in Sections 8 and 9. There are graphs associated to proofs which
trace the ow of logical occurrences, and these graphs are approximately trees
for cut-free proofs, but proofs with cuts can have cycles. We shall discuss
this further in Section 10.
As in the introduction, the existence of short proofs for all propositional
tautologies is equivalent to NP = co   NP . It is not clear exactly what
should create an impassable obstruction to compression. People have looked
at combinatorial principles stated as tautologies in the hope of showing that
the proofs had to be long even if cuts were allowed, but no one has succeeded
in doing this so far. We already saw that the pigeon-hole principle does have
short proofs (polynomial size). Similarly there are nite versions of Ramsey
theorems which have been coded as statements in propositional logic and for
which there are short proofs. Unlike the pigeon-hole principle these short
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proofs have not been given explicitly though. See [47].
In considering issues of complexity one should not be distracted too much
by the interpretation in terms of reasoning. It seems more natural to view
these as combinatorial problems which are merely expressed in the language
of logic. Indeed they seem to have a natural geometry to them, discussed in
Section 10.
How can one try to prove the cut-elimination theorem? The rst point
to understand is that it is not simply a matter of expressing the cut rule
in terms of the others. When one studies logic as an undergraduate one
is frequently told that various languages are equivalent, or various proof
systems are equivalent, by dint of rules that permit translations from one to
the other. That is not what is happening here. One has to operate on an
actual proof, and the argument is more global in nature.
Roughly speaking the argument works by systematically going through
a proof and simplifying the cuts. One starts at the bottom, near the nal
sequent, and works upwards, trying to push the cuts up until one encounters
axioms or other simple situations. For instance, if we get to a cut of the form
A! A A! B
A! B
we can eliminate it stupidly by throwing away the axiom. In general though
we have to take into account the specic structure of the situation. Consider
the following situation.
 ! A
A! B A! C
A;A! B ^ C
A! B ^ C
 ! B ^ C
We used here rst the rule for introducing a conjunction on the right, then a
contraction, then a cut. Think of this as appearing in the middle of a proof,
so that we have a proof 
0
of   ! A, a proof 
1
of A ! B, and a proof

2
of A ! C, and we are combining these three proofs to get a proof of
  ! B ^ C. We have used here a cut and we want to get rid of it. To do
this we work as follows.
 ! A A! B
  ! B
 ! A A! C
 ! C
 ; ! B ^ C
 ! B ^ C
Here we started with a pair of cuts, followed by the conjunction rule and then
contractions. This gives us another way to combine the proofs 
0
, 
1
, and
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2
into a proof of  ! B ^C. From the point of view of cut elimination this
arrangement is better than the previous one. That might seem strange, since
we now have two cuts instead of one, but the two new cuts are at simpler
stages in the proof than the original one. We have moved the cut up higher
in the proof, across the contraction (from A;A to A). In doing this we have
introduced new contractions (to get from  ;  to  ), but more importantly
we have had to use the proof 
0
of  ! A twice. This is the principal source
of expansion in the process of cut elimination, the duplication of subproofs
that occurs when one pushes the cut up over a contraction.
This example corresponds to the idea of a lemma in ordinary mathemat-
ics. In the original piece of proof we knew that A would imply each of B and
C, we had a derivation of A from  , and we wanted to obtain B ^C. We did
not want to have to derive A from   twice, we wanted one \lemma" to say
that it was true. By using the contraction and cut we were able to do this,
but by eliminating the cut we had to repeat the proof for each application.
The use of the cut enabled us to make a shorter proof, but to gain this
eciency we had to merge two occurrences of A even though they could be
used in completely dierent ways. To understand this point it is helpful to
think of arithmetic. Think of A as saying that some property of numbers
is preserved when one multiplies two of them together. This fact might be
employed several times in the proof, applied to dierent numbers or terms,
even though proved only once. It may be that one lemma is applied to terms
obtained from previous applications of itself. This type of phenomenon occurs
in the examples discussed in Sections 8 and 9.
Here is another example, but in predicate logic this time.
A! F (t)
A! 9xF (x)
B ! F (s)
B ! 9xF (x)
A _B ! 9xF (x);9xF (x)
A _ B ! 9xF (x)
F (a)! 
9xF (x)! 
A _B ! 
Again think of this as being part of a larger proof, in which we have already
proofs of A ! F (t), B ! F (s), and F (a) ! , where the eigenvariable a
does not occur free in . Here s and t are terms, which means that they can
be constructed from constants and variables using function symbols. This
provides a nice example of the way that the cut rule can be used; it permits
us to make the lemma that 9xF (x)!  rather than deriving  from F (x)
for each possible choice of x. To push the cut upward we need to make
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separate proofs for s and t. We do this as follows.
A! F (s) F (s)! 
A! 
B ! F (t) F (t)! 
B ! 
A _B ! ;
A _B ! 
We get the proofs of F (s)!  and F (t)!  by taking the proof of F (a)!
 in the original and substituting the terms s and t for the eigenvariable a.
This ability to make substitutions is a fundamental dierence between
predicate and propositional logic. Substitutions interact with the cut rule
in a very substantial way. In passing from F (s) and F (t) to 9xF (x) we are
doing something very strong, since the terms s and t need not have anything
to do with each other.
These two examples illustrate the ideas and eects of pushing a cut up
across a contraction. In fact there is a general procedure which works in all
cases. If we start with

1
 
1
! 
1
; A;A
 
1
! 
1
; A

2
A; 
2
! 
2
 
1
; 
2
! 
1
;
2
where A is an arbitrary formula, then we can replace it with

1
 
1
! 
1
; A;A

2
A; 
2
! 
2
 
1
; 
2
! 
1
;
2
; A

2
A; 
2
! 
2
 
1
; 
2
; 
2
! 
1
;
2
;
2
.
.
.
.
contractions
 
1
; 
2
! 
1
;
2
In doing this we have to duplicate the proof 
2
. This can lead to large
expansion in the size of the proof if we have to do it many times.
This explains how one can push a cut up across any contraction. Consider
the problem of pushing a cut up over a conjunction, as in
 
1
! 
1
A  
2
! 
2
B
 
1
; 
2
! 
1
;
2
; A ^B
A;B; ! 
A ^B; ! 
 ; 
1
; 
2
! ;
1
;
2
We can replace this with
 
2
! 
2
; B
 
1
! 
1
; A A;B; ! 
B; ; 
1
! ;
1
 ; 
1
; 
2
! ;
1
;
2
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Now we are using two cuts, but they have lower complexity.
For this replacement we could just as well have used
 
1
! 
1
; A
 
2
! 
2
; B A;B; ! 
A; ; 
2
! ;
2
 ; 
1
; 
2
! ;
1
;
2
This reects an important feature of cut-elimination: there is no canonical
way to do it. We had a choice here about how to arrange the cuts. Similarly
for contractions, if both appearances of the cut formula A were obtained
from contractions, then we would have a choice as to which subproof to
duplicate rst. In principle we can have procedures of cut-elimination which
go on forever. Of course the point of the theorem is that one can always
nd a way to eliminate cuts in a nite number of steps. One can even make
deterministic procedures by imposing conditions on the manner in which the
transformations are carried out. See [24].
The cases that we have considered illustrate well the general scheme of
the proof of the cut-elimination theorem. The principle is to push the cuts up
higher in the proof, but we have to be careful about the notion of \progress",
because we typically increase the number of cuts at each stage of the process.
In the examples about contractions we made progress in the sense that we
reduced the number of contractions above the cut formula, even though we
may increase the total number of contractions by adding them below the
cut. In the example with conjunctions we reduced the complexity of the cut
formula. It is not hard to make examples to exhaust the possibilities, but
a complete proof requires a tedious verication of cases that we shall not
provide. (See [25, 57].)
4 Mathematics and formal proofs
Mathematical logic provides a way to formalize ordinary mathematical ac-
tivity, and cut-elimination has a very interesting role in this.
For this story we should back up to the Hilbert program, which sought to
show that mathematics could be formalized in a pure way and that in princi-
ple abstraction could be avoided. (See [6].) One can try to treat mathematics
in a completely symbolic manner, where mathematical formulas are strings
of symbols constructed through xed formal rules. The rules of logical infer-
ence are formal as well and permit the passage from one string of symbols to
another. In this way proofs can be treated as mathematical objects in their
own right and studied mathematically.
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In mathematics we have a natural informal hierarchy of abstraction. We
can start with the very concrete, like natural numbers and nite graphs, and
proceed to the more transcendental, real and complex numbers, real and
complex analysis. We can proceed further from \simple" innite processes
to innite-dimensional ones, like Hilbert spaces and operators on them, then
further still to highly abstract and nonconstructive concepts, often associ-
ated to the axiom of choice, such as ultralters. Many aspects of analysis,
for instance, are touched by the phenomenon of nonconstructive existence
through compactness or the Hahn-Banach theorem.
In some cases these abstractions are \approximately concrete", as with
innite processes which admit well-behaved nite approximations. Some-
times remote abstractions wander into more concrete worlds. Compactness
or the Hahn-Banach theorem may be used to \provide" theoretical solutions
to explicit dierential equations, or compactness can lead to uniform bounds
without providing a clue as to how to generate an actual number. Even more
elementary questions about integers are sometimes treated through transcen-
dental methods or nonconstructive abstractions of compactness.
These phenomena are naturally troubling. The literature is full of debates
and attempts to address the problem. Hilbert's program, in its strongest
form, would have provided a very attractive resolution of these diculties.
It sought to show, roughly speaking, that concrete statements that are true
should always have nite proofs. That the innite methods of general math-
ematical activity would not lead us to trouble, that the innite abstractions
were a convenience that could, in principle, be replaced with more direct
elementary arguments for elementary assertions.
In its strongest form Hilbert's program failed and failed utterly, because
of the celebrated work of Godel.
In some ways Godel's work has had unfortunate negative side eects.
Godel's results have enormous conceptual consequences, and they force one
to confront and accept some troubling phenomena, but some of the ideas
behind Hilbert's program retain their strength despite being overshadowed
by the failure of other aspects.
Gentzen's theorem arose in this context. One can view it as providing
a positive result in contrast with Godel's work. Cut elimination gives an
approach to converting indirect proofs into direct ones. Gentzen's work also
helps to clarify the precise meaning of an \elementary" proof, which Hilbert
had left vague and intuitive.
Cut elimination need not work in an arbitrary logical system, or it may
work with qualications. In arithmetic it may convert a nite proof into an
innite one. Still, one can often control the level of innite processes used
(transnite induction up to a certain ordinal) and thereby obtain \quasi-
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elementary" proofs of elementary statements. One of Gentzen's purposes
was to bring the consistency of arithmetic closer to elementary arguments.
Keep in mind that cut elimination does transform nite proofs into nite
ones in ordinary predicate logic. Arithmetic is simply much more compli-
cated, as we see in Godel's results and the necessity of passing to innite
proofs when eliminating cuts. Remember though that the set of tautologies
in ordinary predicate logic is algorithmically undecidable, and that cut elim-
ination leads to large expansion of proofs. Thus ordinary predicate logic is
nite in ways that arithmetic is not, but the expansion is still there, in a
weaker form.
This view of cut elimination and Hilbert's program is illustrated well by
some work of Girard [25]. The story begins with Hilbert's program in reverse:
Furstenberg and Weiss [20] found a very elegant proof through transcenden-
tal methods of dynamical systems of the van der Waerden theorem [59] on
arithmetic progressions. In this case the elementary proof came rst, the
short nonelementary proof arrived much later. Girard showed however that
one could recover the elementary combinatorial arguments by applying the
procedure of cut elimination to the methods of Furstenberg and Weiss.
Other examples of analysis of mathematical proofs through cut elimi-
nation can be found in [5, 32, 33, 34] and in unpublished work of Kreisel
concerning a theorem of Littlewood in number theory. For this type of anal-
ysis a basic tool is the no counterexample interpretation of Kreisel for turning
innite arguments into nite ones through the introduction of functionals.
This basic idea, of looking for consequences of Gentzen's work for ordinary
mathematics, occurs repeatedly in the writings of Kreisel [37, 39, 38], and
he raises many concrete questions. Progress has been made, but the issue
remains to be addressed in a strong way.
5 Remarks about the subformula property
A proof satises the subformula property if every formula that appears in the
proof also arises as a subformula of a formula in the endsequent. We saw in
Section 3 that any provable sequent has a proof which enjoys the subformula
property, because any cut-free proof has this property.
We should be a little bit careful here. What exactly is a subformula?
Basically A is a subformula of B if you can get B from A by adding things to
it. For propositional logic this is straightforward, but quantiers in predicate
logic bring a subtlety with them. We can start with a formula R(t), where
F is a unary relation and t is a term, and we can build from it the formula
9xR(x). We consider R(t) to be a subformula of 9xR(x). If s is another
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term then R(s) is also considered to be a subformula of 9xR(x).
This is an enormous dierence between propositional and predicate logic.
In propositional logic if we know a formula then we know its ancestors ex-
actly. If it were true in predicate logic that the ancestors of a formula are
determined by the formula itself, then there would be an algorithm for decid-
ing which sentences are tautologies, which is not true. This would amount
to saying that any tautology would have a cut-free proof which could then
be controlled.
The size of the formulas which appear in a cut-free proof in propositional
logic is bounded by the size of formulas in the endsequent. In predicate logic
this does not work because the terms that appear inside the proof can be
larger than the ones in the endsequent. In both propositional and predicate
logic the size of a cut-free proof { the number of symbols in the proof { can be
controlled in terms of the size of the endsequent together with the number of
lines in the proof. (See [35].) In both cases the number of lines in a cut-free
proof can be very large compared to the size of the endsequent because of
the presence of contractions.
We should emphasize the relation between the subformula property and
the idea of \lemmas" in a proof. Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem is often
described as a procedure for making direct proofs, for avoiding intermediate
results which are more general than the nal theorem. The subformula prop-
erty is a manifestation of this idea, that nothing occurs in the proof which
is more general than the nal result. To understand this in a more concrete
way think about proving a formula A(t) that has no quantiers but does
have a term t in it. In establishing this tautology we might use formulas of
the form R(s
i
) many times, for various terms s
i
. One can imagine that a
shorter proof might be possible using 8xR(x). This would not be allowed in
a cut-free proof, because of the subformula property, and because A(t) has
no quantiers. In a cut-free proof all occurrences of R(s
i
) for the relevant
terms s
i
would have to be listed separately.
Some of these phenomena occur in the examples discussed in Sections 8
and 9 below.
6 The Craig interpolation theorem
Roughly speaking the Craig interpolation theorem [17] states that if one can
prove the sequent
A! B
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in LK then one can also prove the sequents
A! C and C ! B
where the formula C { called the interpolant of A and B { involves only
the language common to A and B. Common language means the common
propositional variables in the case of propositional logic, and the relations,
functions, and constants for the predicate case.
In terms of reasoning this is not at all surprising. If A involves apples
and oranges, B involves apples and bananas, and A implies B, then A ought
to imply a statement that involves only apples, and B ought to follow from
a statement that involves only apples. The oranges should not help, and the
bananas should not hurt.
So what is the mystery then? The Craig theorem is trickier to prove
than one might think. One has to have the same statement about apples
for both A and B! To construct C and proofs of A ! C and C ! B the
cut-elimination theorem is extremely useful. Once one has a cut-free proof,
the construction of C is a fairly simple combinatorial problem (see [40] and
also [25, 57]).
In fact one can formulate Craig interpolation in purely combinatorial
terms [10], in such a way that the special nature of formulas does not really
matter. The interpolation theorem can be seen as a general statement with
few structural requirements that would apply as well to graphs or polygons
or tessellated surfaces as to formulas in logic.
It is important here that we have cut elimination to start with. It would
be much more dicult to give a general combinatorial formulation of Craig
interpolation for proofs with cuts. With cut-elimination as a starting point
one need only understand how to combine basic objects in a natural way.
Formulas are the basic objects in logic, but to have a more combinatorial
image it is nicer to think of them simply as trees. Think of coding the
construction of a formula by a tree, and then forgetting the logic and just
keeping the tree. It is easy to combine two trees, by connecting them at the
root, and after cut elimination this is essentially the kind of operation that
Craig interpolation requires. If there are cuts in the proof then the matter
is entirely dierent. One would then have to go inside the structure of the
objects, rather than simply combining them.
This brings us to an interesting point about cut-elimination, as an indi-
cation of simplicity or \niteness" of the combinatorics of proofs. It is better
to have cut elimination with large expansion than to not have it at all. In
what other contexts in mathematics is there something analogous? Some
\normalization" which always exists (in a nontrivial way)? One is tempted
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to draw an analogy with singularities of algebraic varieties. Resolution of
singularities is a dicult matter, but it reects an underlying niteness that
is not typically present in analysis or topology, for instance.
Cut elimination permits us to derive some general results through eective
constructions, like Craig Interpolation and Herbrand's theorem (discussed
below). However, the use of cut elimination does not provide interesting
bounds. One constructs the interpolant by induction, at each step combining
old interpolating formulas to get a new one. Contractions in the proof do
not lead to contractions of interpolating formulas. In fact the interpolant
reects the entire construction in the proof. For this reason its size may be
very large compared to the size of the endsequent, but linear in the size of
the cut-free proof.
It is not apparent that interpolation should necessarily be as complicated
as cut elimination.
What kind of bounds on the size of the interpolant C can one obtain in
terms of the sizes of A and B? If the interpolant C must be large compared
to A and B, what would that imply about the structure of A! B?
In rst-order predicate logic (with equality) one can have nonrecursive
expansion for the size of the interpolant over the size of the endsequent, as
in [19, 41].
What about propositional logic? Is it true that the size of C is always
bounded by a polynomial in the sizes of A and B? If so, then one would have
a general result in complexity theory, namelyNP \ co NP  P=poly. This
problem is a weaker cousin of P = NP , but it is equally unknown. The main
point is that a language which is in NP \ co   NP can be coded in terms
of a family of sequents A
n
! B
n
of controlled size, n = 1; 2; 3; : : :, and a
family of interpolants C
n
involving only the common variables of A
n
and B
n
would lead to a family of circuits which characterize the original language.
See [42, 43, 11] for more details.
If one does not believe in polynomial bounds for general classes of prob-
lems which appear to require exponential time, then one would expect the
failure of polynomial bounds for Craig interpolation.
This brings us back to our earlier questions about what is a dicult proof,
what are the mechanisms by which proofs with cuts can be much shorter than
cut-free proofs, etc. These questions t well with the problem of knowing
what structure in a sequent A ! B is needed if the interpolant C is always
large. See [11] for some results in this direction.
What kinds of bounds can one get for the sizes of the proofs of A! C and
C ! B in terms of the proof of  : A ! B? In the propositional case, for
instance, can one construct C and proofs of A! C and C ! B whose sizes
are bounded by a polynomial in the size of ? Is there a polynomial-time
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algorithm for nding these proofs? These are all questions that are open.
See [11] for further discussion of these matters.
There is an interesting variant of these questions, in which one starts
with a truth assignment  for the variables common to A and B and looks
for either a proof of A

! or ! B

of controlled size. Roughly speaking
A

and B

are obtained from A and B using the truth assignment . See
[11] for details. The idea is that if we have an interpolating formula C,
then  converts C simply into \true" or \false", and proofs of A ! C and
C ! B would then give rise to either a proof of A

! or of ! B

according
to whether we obtained \false" or \true" from C, respectively. If for each
truth assignment  we can decide which of A

! or ! B

is provable in
polynomial time, then that is essentially the same as nding an interpolant
C of polynomial size. In both cases we get a function which can be computed
in polynomial time even if the descriptions are not the same.
7 Herbrand's theorem
Let us begin with a simple version of Herbrand's theorem.
Theorem 2 If A(x) is a formula without quantiers in which the variable x
appears free, then ! 9xA(x) is provable in LK if and only if there is a nite
collection of terms t
1
; : : : ; t
n
such that ! A(t
1
); : : : ; A(t
n
) is provable using
only propositional rules (i.e., without quantier rules).
We should emphasize that A(x) is allowed to be a formula, and not simply
a relation, so that A(x) might have the form F (x)^:G(x;  (x)), for instance.
Roughly speaking, the theorem says that if you can prove 9xA(x), then
you can make the existence explicit by producing a nite collection of terms,
at least one of which satises the property A(). Of course the converse is
true because of the 9 : right and contraction rules.
The theorem is very easy to obtain once we have cut elimination. If
! 9xA(x) is provable, then it is provable without cuts. Thus we may assume
that we have a cut-free proof  of ! 9xA(x) to begin with. In particular 
enjoys the subformula property. This means that any formula that occurs in
 and which has a quantier in it must be an occurrence of 9xA(x).
Let us start from the bottom of , at the endsequent ! 9xA(x), and
think about what happens as we go up in the proof. We may pass through
contraction rules, which would cause 9xA(x) to be duplicated as we go up.
The rst moment at which 9xA(x) is derived from something other than a
contraction rule it must be obtained using 9 : right, starting from a formula
of the form A(t) for some term t.
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It is easy to use these observations to reorganize  to get a proof of
! A(t
1
); : : : ; A(t
n
) as desired, where t
1
; : : : ; t
n
are the terms that arise when
we peel o the existential quantiers. More formally, one can rst remove
the contractions \at the bottom" and make some minor reorganizations as
needed to get a proof of ! 9xA(x); : : : ;9xA(x), where none of the occur-
rences of 9xA(x) was obtained using a contraction, and then one peels o
the quantiers to get ! A(t
1
); : : : ; A(t
n
). Notice that only propositional
rules could have been used to obtain the A(t
i
)'s, because of the subformula
property (since A(x) is quantier-free).
The basic principles of this argument are very general. Let us work with
general formulas in \prenex" form, which means that all the quantiers are
on the outside. (Thus 9x8y(F (x) ^ G(y)) is prenex, (9xF (x)) ^ (8yG(y))
is not. Formulas can always be put into prenex form.) Suppose that a
sequent   !  consists only of prenex formulas and has a cut-free proof
 in LK. The midsequent theorem [22, 23, 25] states that we can modify
 to get a new proof 
0
which has the property that as soon as one of the
quantier rules is used in the proof, only quantier rules and contraction
rules can be used afterwards. One should think of a proof as being coded
by a tree here, with dierent branches being independent of each other until
the moment that they meet on the way to the endsequent. It is easy to see
how the midsequent theorem is established. Because a cut-free proof enjoys
the subformula property, all formulas that appear in it are in prenex form.
Once a formula has a quantier attached to it, one cannot use it actively in
a logical rule that is not a quantier rule. This makes it easy to rearrange
the proof in order to use all the quantier rules after the nonquantier rules.
The midsequent theorem shows that in principle the quantier rules are
not essential for predicate logic. In fact there is a general statement to the
eect that tautologies in predicate logic can be converted into propositional
tautologies without losing information. We gave a version of this in Theo-
rem 2, but it is not as simple to accommodate alternation of universal and
existential quantiers. To handle the general case one uses function symbols
which were not in the original language, called Skolem functions. These spe-
cial functions code relationships between terms in the Herbrand disjunction
which allow one to recover the statement in predicate language. See [25] for
more information.
Let us illustrate the meaning of Herbrand's theorem in ordinary mathe-
matics with the following scenario. Suppose that we are interested in some-
thing like the word problem in nitely presented groups (or semigroups, which
are technically simpler for this discussion). We might then be interested in
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a sequent of the form
8x
1
R
1
(x
1
); : : : ;8x
k
R
k
(x
k
)! B(t)
where the formulas 8x
i
R
i
(x
i
) contain information from the relations of the
group (in the form that an element of the group multiplied by a relation gives
back the same element of the group), and where B(t) is a formula without
quantiers which contains the information that a given word, represented
here as a term t, is trivial in the group.
This sequent is in almost the same form as for the above formulation of
Herbrand's theorem. That is, we can use the negation rules to convert the
universal quantiers on the left side into existential quantiers on the right
side. We have several formulas instead of just one, but they can be combined
on the right with disjunctions. We have several quantiers, but that does
not really matter.
If one can prove such a sequent, then it means that one can show that
the word is trivial in the group using the given relations. Of course if one
can prove this one should not use the relations more than a nite number of
times, even though formulas of the form 8x
i
R
i
(x
i
) allow for innitely many
possible choices of x
i
a priori. Herbrand's theorem is a general statement
to this eect. Cut-elimination provides a procedure to make explicit the
relations that are needed. Proofs with cuts can be shorter by not making
explicit the way that the relations are used, or how often. This is the power
of quantiers; they are \innite" objects which can enable one obtain \nite"
conclusions much more quickly.
We shall look more closely at an example of this type in Section 9, in
connection with the problem of dening large numbers in arithmetic. Before
we do that we discuss another example from analysis.
8 The John-Nirenberg theorem
The John-Nirenberg theorem is a result in real analysis whose proof provides
an interesting example for cut elimination and the combinatorics of proofs.
Let f(x) be a locally integrable function on the real line. Given an interval
I in R, write A(f; I) for the average of f over I,
A(f; I) =
1
jIj
Z
I
f(y) dy;
where jIj denotes the length of I. Dene the \mean oscillation of f over I"
by
mo(f; I) =
1
jIj
Z
I
jf(x) A(f; I)j dx:
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We say that f has bounded mean oscillation (BMO) if
kfk

:= sup
I
mo(f; I) <1:
Bounded functions satisfy this property, but some unbounded functions do
too, such as f(x) = log jxj. Note however that jxj

does not lie in BMO for
any  6= 0.
Think of the restriction of f to an interval I as being a localized snapshot
of f . The BMO condition provides a way to say that these snapshots all
have bounded averages, except that we permit ourselves to subtract o the
mean value as a kind of normalization.
How big can a BMO function really be? A simple fact is that
jfx 2 I : jf(x) A(f; I)j > gj 
kfk


jIj
for all  > 0, where we write jEj for the Lebesgue measure of E. This is just
Tchebychev's inequality,
 jfx 2 I : jf(x) A(f; I)j > gj 
Z
I
jf(x) A(f; I)j dx
simply by denition. However, it turns out that for a BMO function we
actually have exponential decay of the measure as a function of , that is
jfx 2 I : jf(x) A(f; I)j > gj  2
 ( 1)=4
kfk

jIj
for all  > 0. This means that BMO functions are closer to being bounded
than it might appear at rst. This estimate is roughly the best possible,
because the logarithm has exactly exponential decay on the interval [0; 1],
for instance.
This exponential decay is a famous result of John and Nirenberg. See
[21, 56, 52]. It is very important that in the denition of BMO we take
the supremum over all intervals. We certainly do not get exponential decay
on an interval I simply from the knowledge that mo(f; I) is nite for that
particular interval.
This is the general setting of the John-Nirenberg theorem. Let us now
sketch the proof. The main lemma comes from a construction of Calderon
and Zygmund, and it says the following. Suppose that we have an interval J
and a function h on J such that
1
jJ j
Z
J
jh(y)j dy  1:
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Then we can nd a subset E of J with the following three properties. First,
E has at least half the points of J ,
jEj 
1
2
jJ j:
Second, h is not too big on E,
jh(x)j  2 for almost all x 2 E:
The third property is more geometric. It says that JnE can be realized as
the disjoint union of a collection of subintervals fJ
i
g of J , in such a way that
1
jJ
i
j
Z
J
i
jh(y)j dy  4
for each i.
To understand what all of this means think about the rst two properties
and forget about the third for a moment. To get these properties we do not
need any kind of special geometry, it is simply a question of measure theory.
If jhj  1 on average, then we cannot have jhj >
1
2
on more than half the
points.
This measure-theoretic argument says nothing about what happens on
the set where jhj >
1
2
. The point of the Calderon-Zygmund construction is
to break up this \bad" set into pieces where the average is bounded again,
as stated in the third property. We cannot say exactly what happens on the
bad set, but we can organize it in a good way.
Let us describe the main point of the Calderon-Zygmund construction.
Start with J and break it into its two halves. On each of these ask the
question \Is the average of jhj larger than 2?" When the answer is yes put
that interval aside. It will become one of the J
i
's. When the answer is no
take the given interval, cut it into halves, and ask the same question about
the two new intervals.
Repeating this process indenitely we get a bunch of intervals on which
the average was larger than 2. Outside these intervals jhj  2 a:e: The
intervals are disjoint, and one can show that the sum of their measures is

1
2
jJ j, using the assumption that the average of jhj on J is  1. The
averages of jhj on these \bad" intervals is  4. This comes because we called
an interval bad at the rst moment that it was bad, it came from splitting
an interval on which the average of jhj was  2.
This is roughly how the Calderon-Zygmund construction works. Let us
explain how one proves the John-Nirenberg theorem. Fix an interval I, and
assume for simplicity that kfk

 1. We apply the Calderon-Zygmund con-
struction to h = f  A(f; I) on I. We get a set on which jf  A(f; I)j 
1
2
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and a bunch of intervals fI
i
g on which the average of jf A(f; I)j is bounded
by 4. The main point is to repeat the construction on each I
i
, applied to
the function f   A(f; I
i
). The assumption that kfk

 1 implies that the
average of jf  A(f; I
i
)j over I
i
is bounded by 1. To relate what we get back
to f we use the fact that the average of jf  A(f; I)j over each I
i
is bounded
by 4, whence
jA(f; I
i
) A(f; I)j  4:
We repeat the Calderon-Zygmund construction on each I
i
, for each one
we get a new family of intervals, we apply the construction to each of those,
and repeat the process indenitely. One can make computations to derive
the exponential decay mentioned earlier.
For us the Calderon-Zygmund construction is the \lemma" that we are
applying repeatedly. If we do not make cuts then we have to repeat the
construction on each interval. Instead we can think of proving it once but
using it many times, through contractions and cuts. In each application it
is applied to dierent functions and intervals, and indeed it is applied to
intervals that were produced in an earlier application of the lemma.
We shall not try to make a precise formalization of the proof in logic,
but it should be clear in principle how the elimination of cuts corresponds
to performing the Calderon-Zygmund construction explicitly each time it is
needed, and that with contractions and a cut one can make a smaller proof
with a lot of \coiling" or \cycling" in the proof, coming from the output of
the lemma going back into it as input. This idea can be made more precise
through the logical ow graph, which we discuss in Section 10.
If one wants to treat the proof of the John-Nirenberg theorem more pre-
cisely in terms of logic, then it might be better to work with nite versions
of it. Instead of working with functions on the whole real line let us think
of functions on the set of integers 1; 2; 3; : : : ; 2
N
, where N is a large positive
integer. We still have a natural notion of intervals in this case, although for
technical reasons it is better to restrict ourselves to intervals for which the
number of elements inside is an integer power of 2. This makes it easier to
cut them in half. Instead of Lebesgue measure we use counting measure, so
that the integrals become sums.
If we do this then we can get the same kind of inequalities as before.
For the purposes of analysis the precise constants like 2 and 4 are not so
important, what matters are uniform estimates, with constants which do not
depend on N in this discrete model.
In this discrete model one can formalize the John-Nirenberg inequality
and its proof in fairly simple logical terms. One does not need anything like
the full structure of the real line or measure theory, one could also restrict
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oneself to functions which take values in the rationals to avoid any use of the
real numbers.
This discrete version of the John-Nirenberg theorem also contains all the
information of the original. Notice that there is a small additional subtlety
for the proof. In the real line all intervals are practically the same, one
can change from one to another using an ane mapping. In the discrete
model that is not quite the case, one cannot use dilations to identify intervals
of dierent length. If one were to formalize a proof with cuts this might
require dierent proofs of the Calderon-Zygmund construction for intervals
of dierent lengths, rather than having one proof for all intervals. This could
lead to a requirement for N dierent lemmas in the proof instead of just one,
one lemma for each dyadic length 2
j
.
This expansion in the number of lemmas reects an interesting dier-
ence between \continuous" and \discrete" mathematics. There can be more
symmetries in continuous mathematics which enable one to make shorter
proofs.
Notice the strong role of quantiers in the proof of the John-Nirenberg
theorem. The argument works because we have information about all inter-
vals, as in the condition kfk

 1. This is a common phenomenon in har-
monic analysis, that properties of functions or sets are naturally expressed
in terms of universal quantiers which reect crucial scale-invariance. In
the proof we used universal quantiers to avoid dealing with specic inter-
vals. This lead to a kind of cycling in the argument. In the next section we
describe a dierent example which is easier to analyze and which exhibits
similar features of dynamics in short proofs with cuts.
9 Large numbers
We want to provide now a more precise example where quantiers and the
cut rule can be used to make short proofs, and where explicit proofs would
need to be much longer. We do this in the context of arithmetic, through
the concept of \feasible numbers" [46]. The logical ow graph (Section 10)
associated to the proof described below has a rich structure of cycles.
To try to avoid overloading the reader with syntax let us not review the
manner in which arithmetic is formalized in predicate logic. In short one
species symbols to reect the basic objects and operations in arithmetic
(0;=; <;+, and  for multiplication), and one adds axioms to encode their
basic properties. One of the main objects used in this formalization is the
function s(x), the successor function, which is interpreted in normal math-
ematics as x + 1. This is important for the formalization of mathematical
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induction, which we shall not use here.
We shall also \cheat" a little and add to our version of arithmetic the
operation of exponentiation z
x
with the usual property that (z
x
)
y
= z
xy
.
For the present purpose dealing with the exponential function at the level of
rst principles would be a distraction, but it is certainly possible to dene it
in the framework of Peano arithmetic and to establish its properties.
Let us add a new object to arithmetic, namely the symbol F which repre-
sents a unary relation of feasibility. The idea is that if x represents a natural
number, then F (x) represents the statement that x can be constructed in
some feasible manner. The properties of F can be described as follows:
F (0)
F : equality x = y  (F (x)  F (y))
F : inequality F (x) ^ (y < x)  F (y)
F : successor F (x)  F (s(x))
F : plus F (x) ^ F (y)  F (x+ y)
F : times F (x) ^ F (y)  F (x  y)
To show that a number n is feasible one ought to be able to construct a proof
of F (n). We do not allow induction to be used over formulas containing F .
Otherwise we could prove 8xF (x) in a few steps.
Note that we are not allowing an exponential rule for F .
In mathematical logic one sometimes looks at these axioms together with
:F () for some term  without variables. This gives an inconsistent theory,
but one can study \concrete" consistency, in which proofs with only a \small"
number of formulas cannot prove inconsistency.
To work within sequent calculus as before the preceding rules should be
reformulated, but the point is clear enough and we omit the details. See also
[12], [18].
Given a particular number n one can prove F (n) using the F : successor
rule n times. Of course one can be more clever than that, using addition and
multiplication to reduce substantially the length of the proof of the feasibility
of F (n). It is easy to imagine how one can get down to the realm of log n, but
on average one should not expect to do much better than that. We want to
consider some particular large numbers for which one can nd much shorter
proofs of feasibility.
Dene e
2
(n; 2) recursively for nonnegative integers n by e
2
(0; 2) = 1,
e
2
(n+1; 2) = 2
e
2
(n;2)
. This function has nonelementary growth, i.e., it grows
faster than any nite tower of exponentials. We want to describe a proof of
F (e
2
(n; 2)) with O(n) lines due to Solovay.
Fix an n for which we want to prove F (e
2
(n; 2)). Dene auxiliary formulas
F
i
, i = 0; 1; 2; : : : as follows. We take F
0
(x) = F (x), and we dene F
i
(x)
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recursively by
F
i
(x) is (8z)(F
i 1
(z)  F
i 1
(z
x
)):
Conceptually we can imagine each formula F
i
(x) as dening a nite set of
nonnegative integers. For each i these are the integers x such that the set
corresponding to F
i 1
is closed under the mapping z 7! z
x
. We can think of
these subsets as becoming \smaller" as i increases, and even in an exponential
way.
The main property of these formulas F
i
(x) is that
F
i
(x); F
i
(y)! F
i
(x  y)
is provable. Let us rst explain this in words. This sequent says that if
F
i
(x) and F
i
(y) both hold, then F
i
(x  y) holds too. The hypotheses imply
that (8z)(F
i 1
(z)  F
i 1
(z
x
)) and that (8w)(F
i 1
(w)  F
i 1
(w
y
)) are true.
Applying the second with w = z
x
we get that F
i 1
(z
x
)  F
i 1
((z
x
)
y
) is true
for all x, and hence F
i 1
(z)  F
i 1
((z
x
)
y
) is true because of the assumption
on x. This is the same as F
i
(x  y), because (z
x
)
y
= z
xy
. It is not hard to
formalize this as a proof in sequent calculus, but we leave the details as an
exercise.
Using this property one can show that ! F
i
(2) is provable for each i.
Next we claim that
F
0
(2); F
1
(2); : : : ; F
n
(2)! F
0
(e
2
(n+ 1; 2))(1)
is provable. To see this we use the following building blocks:
F
i
(e
2
(n  i; 2)); F
i 1
(2)! F
i 1
(2
e
2
(n  i; 2))(2)
These sequents are easy to prove using the denitions. They can be combined
through cuts to give (1).
We can now conclude that
! F
0
(e
2
(n+ 1; 2))
is provable. This follows from (1) and the provability of ! F
i
(2) for all i,
established before. It is not hard to see that our proof had a total of O(n)
lines. Of course this is the same as ! F (e
2
(n+ 1; 2)).
The nesting of quantiers in this proof is responsible for the strong com-
pression. Recall that F
i
(x) is dened recursively by (8z)(F
i 1
(z)  F
i 1
(z
x
)).
Thus the number of quantiers in F
i
(x) is 1 plus twice the number of quanti-
ers in F
i 1
(z) and therefore grows exponentially in i. More importantly, in
F
i
(x) we have two occurrences of F
i 1
which lie within the scope of the same
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quantier and which are linked through the implication. By recursion there
is a similar structure within F
i 1
and so forth. This nesting of links is crucial
for the compression and leads to rich dynamical structure. The links combine
to form an exponential number of cycles within the logical ow graph of the
proof. See [12].
There is a notion of curvatures associated to the nesting of links between
formula occurrences. This notion is used in [13] to read a nitely presented
group from the cycles coming from a proof. For the example above the
distortion of a certain subgroup inside the group reects the compression in
the proof and the expansion associated to cut-elimination.
10 A geometric view
How can we really \see" what happens in the preceding examples? Consider
the John-Nirenberg theorem. The Calderon-Zygmund lemma is applied re-
peatedly to its own output to provide the existence of certain families of inter-
vals without listing them explicitly. The proof of the feasibility of e
2
(n+1; 2)
describes the number implicitly without writing out all the multiplications.
In each of these cases an actual computation modelled on the proofs would
have to visit certain formulas over and over again. There is cycling inside
the proof with cuts.
To make this precise we use the concept of a logical ow graph introduced
by Buss [8]. A dierent but related graph was introduced earlier by Girard
[24]. Actually we shall use a modication of Buss' denition, in which we
restrict ourselves to atomic formulas occurring in the proof. Atomic formulas
are formulas without logical connectives. In propositional logic this means
the propositional variables, while in predicate logic it means relations with
their terms. The restriction to atomic formulas seems to be more natural for
geometric and dynamical interpretations of proofs. Atomic formulas are like
particles within a proof, and the logical ow graph traces their motion. To
see cycling it is important to work with atomic formulas, to be able to move
freely up and down the proof.
Let  be a proof of some sequent S. The vertices of the logical ow
graph are the occurrences of atomic formulas in . We connect occurrences
of atomic formulas by an edge only when they are variants of each other.
In propositional logic two occurrences are variants when they represent the
same formula, and in predicate logic we allow the terms within to be dierent.
We attach edges by tracing the logical relationships in a proof. Let us
start with an axiom A; ! ; A. We do not attach any edges to the atomic
subformulas in   and . For the pair of distinguished occurrences of A we
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attach an edge between each pair of their corresponding atomic formulas.
For instance, if A is p_ (:p^ q), then we attach edges between the two outer
p's, the two inner p's, and the two q's.
Next we have to decide how to attach edges in accordance with the rules.
For example, consider the binary rule _ : left,
A; 
1
! 
1
B; 
2
! 
2
A _B; 
1;2
! 
1;2
Each atomic formula on the top has a counterpart in the bottom, and we
attach an edge between the two occurrences. No other edges are attached.
Note that each atomic subformula in the A on top is connected by an edge
to its counterpart in the A _B in the bottom, and similarly for B.
The other logical rules are treated in practically the same manner as the
_ : left rule. The cut and contraction rules are treated dierently. For the
cut rule
 
1
! 
1
; A A; 
2
! 
2
 
1;2
! 
1;2
we attach edges between the atomic subformulas of the two copies of the cut
formula A, and between the atomic subformulas of the  's, 's occurring in
the upper sequents and their counterparts in the lower sequent. No other
edges are attached, and in particular there are no edges from the cut formulas
to the lower sequent. For a contraction,
 ! ; A;A
 ! ; A
A;A; ! 
A; ! 
each atomic subformula in each of the two occurrences of A in the upper
sequent is connected to its counterpart in the lower sequent. Again the atomic
occurrences in  ; in the upper sequent are connected to their counterparts
in the lower sequent, and no other edges are attached. This is the only
situation in which we have vertices attached to more than two edges.
Thus the cut and contraction rules are very dierent geometrically from
logical rules. We shall not pursue this here, but there is much more to be
said about this.
This completes the description of the logical ow graph, except for one
extra ingredient, an orientation. Let us dene rst the sign of a formula.
This simply counts the number of negations involved. Thus in the formula
p^(:q_:(:r)), the p and r occur positively and the q occurs negatively. The
logical connectives ^;_;8;9 do not aect the sign, but  can. An atomic
formula occurs positively in A  B if it occurs positively in B or negatively
in A, and otherwise it occurs negatively. This is because of the implicit
29
negation hidden in . Similarly, in a sequent   ! , an occurrence of an
atomic formula C is said to be positive in the sequent if it occurs positively
in  or negatively in  , and it is said to be negative otherwise.
The logical ow graph has the nice property that any two variants con-
nected by an edge have the same sign, except for axioms and cut rules, where
we connect formulas of opposite sign.
We can use the signs of atomic formulas to dene a natural orientation
for the logical ow graph in the following manner. For an axiom we have
edges from negative occurrences to positive occurrences. For logical rules
and contractions edges between negative occurrences are oriented upwards
and edges between positive occurrences are oriented downwards. In the cut
rule we do the same except for the edges between the cut formulas, where
the orientation goes from positive occurrences to negative occurrences. This
orientation has a natural interpretation in logic [11].
This denes the logical ow graph associated to a proof as a directed
graph. For the authors this kind of geometric picture is extremely helpful in
trying to understand the structure of proofs. It provides a way to trace the
logical relations between dierent occurrences of a formula in a sequent, and
a more global alternative to the usual induction arguments.
To understand the meaning of the logical ow graph it is helpful to begin
with some simple observations. Suppose that we have a proof  in proposi-
tional logic in which the occurrences of a variable p come in distinct connected
components of the graph. Then we can rename all of the occurrences of p in
one component and still have a valid proof.
Sometimes occurrences in a sequent have to be linked within any proof
of it. For example, in the tautology p _ :p ! q _ :q the two q's must have
the same name and therefore must be connected inside the proof. The two
p's do not need to be linked.
In complicated proofs one should expect many links between pairs of
occurrences in the endsequent. For example, if all cut-free proofs  of a
sequent S are of exponential size compared to the size of S, then there must
be a pair of occurrences in S which are connected in the logical ow graph
by an exponential number of links. This is not hard to derive from the
denitions. (One has to be careful about weak occurrences, but they can be
treated as in [11].) Remember from Section 3 that the cut-free proofs of the
nite versions of the pigeon-hole principle in propositional logic must have
exponential size.
From this we see that in some cases proofs must have cycles, i.e., paths
in the logical ow graph which come back to where they started. However
the cycles obtained as above are unoriented.
A basic observation (see [11]) is that proofs without cuts have no oriented
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cycles. The reason for this is that in a proof without cuts we cannot have
edges from positive occurrences to negative occurrences, and an oriented
cycle must contain such an edge.
Proofs without contractions cannot have oriented cycles either. See [11,
13]. This is more amusing geometrically, one has to go further into the logical
structure of the proof.
It is the combination of cuts and contractions that can lead to cycles.
The proof described in Section 9 has an exponential number of cycles, as
we mentioned before. Another example is given in [12] where cycles help to
make a proof short, although less dramatically.
In general, the compression of proofs appears to be closely related to the
presence of cyclic structures. This is reminiscent of certain phenomena of
distortion in nitely presented groups. It is natural to try to use groups to
represent dynamics within proofs, and this is explored in [13].
There are many natural questions concerning the relationship between
cycles and the lengths of proofs. For instance, in [13] the question is raised
of whether one can eliminate cyclic structures more eciently than through
cut elimination.
If we are going to admit the idea of geometric structures attached to proofs
(a prominent theme in the algebraic approach to structure of proofs of Girard
[28, 26, 27, 29]), then we should also think about mappings between spaces.
This opens up a story too long for the present paper, but let us mention
a basic point. The concept of mappings in the context of proofs suggests
that we look for a more general notion of subproof which corresponds to
embeddings. Inner proofs, introduced in [11], provide a candidate for such a
notion. Roughly speaking, an inner proof can spread throughout the original
proof (unlike a subproof), but keeping only some of the wires inside.
Inner proofs provide a notion of localization in a proof. We can ask about
the local and global aspects of cut elimination. Given a proof  and a cut-
free version 
0
, one would like to know whether inner proofs in 
0
correspond
to inner proofs in . This would be useful for matters of complexity, because
it is easier to nd inner proofs inside cut-free proofs, but then one would like
to compress them as much as  is compressed. The usual method of cut-
elimination does not work well for this endeavor, and an alternate method is
introduced in [11] for propositional logic, where some conditions for making
this transformation are given.
A basic point is that the known procedures of cut elimination either
deform paths in the logical ow graph without breaking them, or they split
the paths. One cannot recognize which alternative occurs in a local way. The
problem of paths being split under cut elimination creates an obstruction for
being able to transfer inner proofs in general. The method of [11] exploits
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the extra "determinism" in the history of propositional formulas to preserve
more of the structure of the proof. In this method the splitting of paths is
delayed until the elimination of atomic cuts. This can be accomplished by
an explicit control of contractions.
These issues are related to Craig interpolation in a nice way. Not through
the usual formulation of nding an interpolating formula, but in terms of
splitting the given proof  : A! B when given a truth assignment  to the
common variables of A and B as mentioned at the end of Section 6. If one
could always transfer inner proofs from the cut-free proof 
0
back to , then
one could get linear bounds for the split proofs for a given . This would still
not be enough to give an interpolating function (in the sense of Section 6)
computable in polynomial time. All this remains open.
At this stage one starts to ask oneself a lot of questions about structure
and proofs. Everything goes on the table, nothing is forbidden.
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